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Abstract  
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in many countries mainly through the tax 
code. The adverse effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on 
economic efficiency and growth are large and well documented in the economics 
literature. The main argument in favor of subsidizing owner-occupied housing is 
that it creates positive externalities that offset these adverse effects. This paper 
tests whether homeowners create positive externalities to their immediate 
neighborhood that capitalize into housing prices in multi-storey buildings. Using 
semiparametric hedonic regressions with and without instrumental variables we 
find no evidence of positive externalities from neighborhood homeownership 
rate. This result is robust to relaxing the identification assumptions of our 
instrument using a recently developed set identification method. Our results 
suggest that the adverse efficiency effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-
occupied housing are not offset by positive externalities. 
Key words: Homeownership, neighborhood effects, partial linear model, set 
identification  
JEL classification numbers: D62, R21, R28 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Omistusasumista tuetaan useissa maissa voimakkaasti verojärjestelmän kautta. 
Taloustieteellisen tutkimuskirjallisuuden mukaan omistusasumisen verokohtelu 
aiheuttaa merkittäviä hyvinvointitappioita. Pääargumentit tuen puolesta liittyvät 
omistusasumisesta mahdollisesti aiheutuviin positiivisiin ulkoisvaikutuksiin. Täs-
sä tutkimuksessa testataan empiirisesti, aiheuttavatko omitusasujat kaupunkimai-
sessa naapurustossa sellaisia ulkoisvaikutuksia, jotka kapitalisoituvat asuntojen 
arvoon. Tutkimuksessa käytetään semiparametrisiä hedonisia regressiomalleja 
yhdistettynä instrumenttimuuttujamenetelmiin. Tulosten mukaan asuntojen 
hinnat eivät ole korkeammat sellaisissa naapurustoissa, joissa on korkea omistus-
asumisaste. Tulokset siis viittaavat siihen, että omistusasujat eivät aiheuta positii-
visia ulkoisvaikutuksia, eikä omistusasumisen tuelle löytynyt empiirisiä perus-
teita.  
Asiasanat: Omistusasuminen, naapurustovaikutukset, paloittain lineaarinen malli 
JEL-luokittelu: D62, R21, R28 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Institutional background 5 
3. Data 6 
4. Econometric model 8 
4.1 Model specification 8 
4.2 Instrument choice 10 
4.3 Estimation 11 
5. Results 13 
5.1 Main results 13 
5.2 Robustness check using set identification 15 
6. Conclusions 19 
References 21 
Appendix. Additional regression results. 25 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in many western countries. In most cases, 
the subsidy is channeled through the tax code by excluding imputed rental 
income and capital gains from homeowners’ taxable income while allowing them 
to deduct mortgage interest payments (Hendershott and White, 2000; Englund, 
2003). The adverse effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on 
economic efficiency and growth are well documented in the economics 
literature.1 Furthermore, it has been reported that the tax benefits are regressive 
and benefit mostly middle- and high-income households (Hills, 1991; Poterba, 
1992; Poterba and Sinai, 2008; Saarimaa, 2011). Given these facts, the main 
argument in favor of subsidizing homeownership has to be that it creates positive 
externalities or social benefits.  
The case for positive externalities from homeownership is based on the 
hypothesis that homeowners put more weight on the condition and amenity levels 
of their neighborhood than renters. This is because in most cases a house is the 
single most important asset in a homeowner’s wealth portfolio, and thus, a 
homeowner’s wealth level depends on the quality of their immediate 
neighborhood. This should create incentives for homeowners to engage in 
activities that improve neighborhood quality. If homeowners’ actions improve 
neighborhood quality, neighborhoods with high homeownership rates are more 
desirable for prospective buyers and higher neighborhood quality translates into 
higher housing prices.2  
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Hoff and Sen (2005) present formal models 
where homeowners are able to reap the benefits from their investment in 
neighborhood amenities (broadly speaking) even if they move away from the 
neighborhood. This happens because improved neighborhood quality gets 
capitalized into house values. Renters, on the other hand, are unable to capitalize 
on their investment to the same extent, because their housing costs increase and 
landlords capture the increased return on housing capital. Moreover, ex ante 
contracting for these contingencies is very difficult. In fact, if rents rise 
sufficiently improvements in neighborhood quality may even result in a welfare 
loss for some renters. 
                                              
1 These include inefficient allocation of the capital stock (Berkovec and Fullerton, 1992; Skinner, 1996; 
Gervais, 2002), suboptimal household wealth portfolios (Brueckner, 1997; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; 
Chetty and Szeidl 2012) and frictions in the labor market (Oswald, 1999; Coulson and Fisher, 2009; Head 
and Lloyd-Ellis, 2012). 
2 It is somewhat unclear whether all homeowners’ actions create external benefits in a broader sense. 
Homeowners may, for example, oppose the building of social housing in their neighborhoods, and thus, 
only shift the possible harm to other neighborhoods and households. Nevertheless, these activities should 
raise house prices in the neighborhood. 
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Empirical research on the effects of homeownership is growing, but the results so 
far are mixed. A typical empirical strategy has been to look at the effects of 
homeownership on individual outcomes and behavior, such as voting, civic 
participation or child achievement. The results from this literature remain 
inconclusive because of major endogeneity issues in estimation. For example, 
Dipasquale and Glaeser (1999) find that homeowners are more politically 
involved. Green and White (1997), Boehm and Schlottmann (1999), Aaronson 
(2000) and Haurin et al. (2002) find that homeownership is associated with 
improved child outcomes. Hilber (2010) finds evidence that homeowners are 
more likely to engage in creating and maintaining neighborhood specific social 
capital especially in areas with inelastic housing supply where social capital is 
likely to capitalize into housing prices. 
However, some recent studies seem to indicate that some if not all of the positive 
effects of homeownership found in the earlier literature are driven by inadequate 
control of unobservable factors that are correlated with homeownership. For 
example, Barker and Miller (2009) argue that the beneficial effects of 
homeownership on several measures of child welfare are overestimated in earlier 
literature. Similarly, using an exogenous social experiment as their identifying 
assumption, Engelhardt et al. (2010) find that homeownership has no effect on 
political involvement of low-income households.  
In this paper, instead of looking at the effects of homeownership on outcomes or 
behavior of individuals, we simply ask: are houses more valuable in 
neighborhoods with higher homeownership rates. If homeowners’ investments 
increase neighborhood quality, they should be reflected in housing prices.3 Our 
strategy is to estimate a hedonic house price model where neighborhood 
homeownership rate is included as an explanatory variable. Coulson et al. (2003) 
and Coulson and Li (2011) use this strategy and find a positive association 
between neighborhood homeownership rate and prices of single-family homes. 
Both papers use data from the American Housing Survey. A clear problem in 
using survey data with a hedonic model is that house prices are not from actual 
transactions but estimated by the owners in the survey. Banzlaf and Farooque 
(2012) show that although self-reported house values are correlated with 
transaction prices, they do not reflect local public goods as well as transaction 
prices. Furthermore, the analyses in Coulson et al. (2003) and Coulson and Li 
(2011) are limited to neighborhoods composed of single-family homes. It is not 
clear whether their results extend to other housing structures or neighborhoods 
consisting of other than single-family homes. 
Our analysis differs from and complements previous studies in a number of 
ways. First, we use geo-referenced house transaction data which facilitates the 
                                              
3 Recently Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) and Autor et al. (2011) have found that residential investments 
have significant price spillover effects on neighboring houses.  
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use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and more precise measurement of 
neighborhood attributes. Second, precise geo-referencing together with semi-
parametric econometric techniques allow us to control for unobserved 
neighborhood attributes that do not vary within a relatively small neighborhood.4 
Third, we concentrate on housing units in multi-storey apartment buildings, 
which are the prevailing housing structure in urban areas. The problem in using 
data from neighborhoods with single-family houses is that, at least in our 
application of Finnish data, they are almost exclusively owner-occupied. This 
makes it difficult to separate the neighborhood effects of homeownership from 
amenities offered by a neighborhood consisting of single-family houses, such as 
housing structure, open space, gardens and so forth. Concentrating on apartment 
buildings in a built-up urban area also means that housing supply is relatively 
inelastic facilitating capitalization, as it is costly to increase density in the study 
area.5  
Finally, it is likely that any neighborhood effects of homeownership are tied to 
the particular housing structure in the neighborhood.6 For example, homeowners 
living in single-family houses have a much higher degree of authority on house 
exterior, yard or garden appearance than their counterparts living in multiunit 
apartment buildings. Single-family homeowners may also have more connection 
to neighborhood amenities and the actions of their neighbors so they have more 
to gain from increased neighborhood quality (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). 
Furthermore, homeowners’ incentives may also be tied to housing structure. As 
Linneman (1985), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Glaeser (2011) point out, the 
major maintenance problems in multi-unit buildings are building, not unit 
specific. This leads to an obvious common pool problem as the owners of 
individual units in a multi-unit building have an incentive to free-ride on the 
expense of other owners in the building when it comes to investments into 
common facilities and building attributes. This may apply to neighborhood 
amenities as well. It is of obvious interest to see whether homeowners create 
externalities in an urban environment consisting mostly of multi-storey apartment 
buildings or whether these externalities are confined to single-family housing 
neighborhoods. These aspects are of interest because, for instance, in Finland 
over 40 percent of units in multi-storey apartment buildings are owner-occupied.7  
                                              
4 For recent examples of these methods in hedonic models, see McMillen (2010) and McMillen and 
Redfearn (2010).  
5 Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2008) find that capitalization of local amenities is stronger in 
areas where housing supply is constrained. Hilber (2010) finds that investment in neighborhood social 
capital is higher among homeowners in built-up neighborhoods.   
6 In fact, Barker and Miller (2009) find that the effect of homeownership on child outcomes varies 
depending on whether the family lives in a single-family home or in a multi-unit structure.  
7 Homeownership in urban areas and multi-storey buildings is common in other countries as well. For 
example, according statistics reported in Focus on London (2011), homeownership rate in the City 
borough is nearly 60 percent and 36 percent in Westminster. According to U.S. Census Bureau, 
homeownership rates in New York City and Chicago city are 33 and 48, respectively. According to 
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A caveat in this type of research is that the neighborhood homeownership rate is 
likely to be endogenous in a simple regression model either due to omitted 
variables or simultaneity. We address this problem by using a semiparametric 
approach with and without instrumental variables. In fact, concentrating the 
analysis on multiunit buildings offers a natural choice for an instrument. The 
arguments by Linneman (1985), Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Glaeser (2011) 
suggest that housing structure, and in particular, the number of housing units in a 
building should drive the homeownership rate of a neighborhood and should be a 
valid instrument. We elaborate on this below.  
We find no evidence of positive externalities from neighborhood homeownership 
rate that capitalize into housing prices in different models we estimate. We also 
test the robustness of these results by relaxing the identification assumptions of 
our instrument using the method proposed by Nevo and Rosen (2012). In this 
method, the instrument is allowed to be correlated with the error term of the 
hedonic regression, while providing a meaningful set identification result. Using 
this method we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the true effect of 
neighborhood homeownership on housing prices is zero. Although these more 
robust results are somewhat imprecise, they are consistent with the fact that the 
adverse efficiency effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing are 
not offset by positive externalities. This means that the tax favored status that 
homeownership enjoys in many countries should be questioned. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
institutional background. In section 3 the econometric model is presented. 
Section 4 introduces the data and section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Eurostat’s Urban Audit, the homeownership rate in Madrid is 78, in Paris 33 and in Rome 64. 
Unfortunately, we have not found data on homeownership rates according to building type. 
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2. Institutional background 
We utilize data from the city of Helsinki, which is the capital of Finland. 
Helsinki has a population of almost 600,000 and the city can be thought of as one 
housing and labor market region, although commuting from surrounding cities is 
easy and frequent. Roughly 48 percent of households living in Helsinki are 
homeowners. This is a much lower percentage than the national average of 65 
percent. The difference is mostly due to a large number of students living in 
Helsinki and also because single-family units are more often owner-occupied and 
single-family units are rare in a dense urban area.  
In Finland owner-occupied units in multi-unit buildings are part of cooperatives 
that are incorporated as limited liability companies. This form of ownership is 
considered as home owning just as much as owning a single-family house and 
the same tax benefits accrue to both types of homeowners.8 Membership of a 
cooperative is obtained by buying the shares on the open market, and the shares 
can be traded freely. The shares are treated as private property and can be used as 
collateral on mortgage loans just as single family houses. The company owns all 
the common facilities and usually the lot as well. The executive board consists of 
shareholders and the board is responsible for maintenance and investment 
decisions concerning common facilities.  
In some cases, the housing company owns the building but the lot is owned by 
the city of Helsinki, which leases the lot to the company. This is an important 
distinction because neighborhood quality capitalizes into land value and land 
owners benefit from any improvements in neighborhood quality. Thus, if lot 
rents correctly reflect land value households living on rented lots do not have 
incentives to make investments into the neighborhood any more than renter 
households However, the contracts are long term (up to 70 years), land rents are 
well below market rents and most importantly the rents are tied to the general 
price level (general cost of living index) and do not reflect changes in 
neighborhood amenities. This means that neighborhood investments are not 
reflected in lot rents, but are capitalized into housing prices. We can control for 
whether the unit is situated at own lot in our econometric models. 
Owning a share does not require the owner to live in the unit in question and the 
owner can freely rent the unit out. In this case, the household living in the unit is 
registered as a renter household. In fact, around half of the privately owned rental 
units in Finland are rented out this way by private individuals. This institutional 
setting creates within building variation in homeownership rates across the city.  
 
                                              
8 The transaction tax is lower (1.6 percent) when buying housing company shares compared to buying a 
property (4 percent). 
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3. Data 
We use data from two sources. First, we have access to individual transaction 
price data provided to us by the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT). 
The data set is based on transactions where major real estate brokerage firms 
acted as intermediary. We concentrate on transactions made in Helsinki in 2006 
and 2007. This choice is made because we have data on neighborhood 
characteristics only for a single year of 2006. It is plausible that neighborhood 
characteristics change slowly so using transaction data from two years should not 
be a problem. After dropping observations with missing characteristics and 
insufficient address information for geo-coding purposes, the total sample size is 
7,472 units.  
The second data source is the Grid Database produced by Statistics Finland, 
which is used to measure neighborhood characteristics (Statistics Finland, 2010). 
The grid size is 250 meters x 250 meters and each grid includes, in addition to 
grid coordinates, information on socio-economic and age structure of the 
population, building characteristics, employment and service levels. The housing 
units are geo-coded to the grids.  
Descriptive statistics of the data are reported in Table 1. The housing 
characteristics included in the data are the unit’s floor area, age, condition 
(evaluated for internal purposes by the broker as good, satisfactory or poor), 
maintenance charge (includes heating, maintenance, property taxes, interest on 
company debt etc.), indicator that the building is situated on own or rented lot, 
elevator, floor level and the total number of floors in the building. The data also 
include the address so we are able to measure exact road distances to the central 
business district (CBD), to the nearest commuter rail or subway stop and to sea 
shore using the GIS techniques. Table 1 also includes descriptive statistics of the 
neighborhood variables used in the econometric analysis.  
Obviously, we do not know whether 250 meters x 250 meters grids are the right 
neighborhood scale. We also estimated all the econometric models using a grid 
size of 750 meters x 750 meters and the results remained the same. We also tried 
to estimate models where, in addition to the grid, we also included neighborhood 
characteristics of the surrounding grids as separate variables. However, these 
models suffered from major multicollinearity problems because neighborhood 
characteristics of neighboring grids are highly correlated. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Dwelling characteristics:
Price (€) 172,585 113,801 60,000 1,500,000
Floor area (m2) 53.7 25.4 11 362
Age (in years) 54.7 22.5 2 136
Condition (broker estimate):
   Good 0.55 0.50 0 1
   Satisfactory 0.39 0.49 0 1
   Poor 0.06 0.23 0 1
Situated at own lot 0.76 0.43 0 1
Elevator 0.32 0.47 0 1
Floor level 3.04 1.65 1 9
Total number of floors in the building 4.92 1.69 2 9
Maintenance charge (€/m2/month) 2.90 0.75 0 8
Road distances (km):
   CBD 5.80 4.49 0.32 19.2
   Nearest train or subway stop 1.25 0.80 0.002 5.83
   Sea 1.23 1.31 0.01 7.28
Neighborhood characteristics (grid):
Homeownership rate 0.49 0.14 0.00 0.98
Household median income (€) 31,756 8,847 13,778 144,092
Share of college educated adults 0.28 0.11 0.02 0.72
Unemployment rate 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.42
Share of pension households 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.81
Share of households with children 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.62
Number of  service jobs per capita 0.44 1.00 0.00 31.02
Number of buildings 21 12 2 67
Population 834 567 22 2374
Mean floor area of units 55.5 13.3 30.3 185.8
Number of units per building 35.4 18.0 1.1 117.8
Note: The data consist of 7,472 dwelling transactions from Helsinki in 2006 and 2007. All 
observations are from multi-storey buildings.
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4. Econometric model  
4.1 Model specification 
This section discusses our empirical approach that is based on the hedonic model 
(see Rosen, 1974). In general, the functional form of the hedonic price function is 
unknown and nonlinear (see e.g. Ekeland et al., 2004). Several recent papers 
have allowed nonlinearities by estimating flexible non- or semiparametric 
hedonic house price models (see e.g. Bajari and Kahn, 2005; Redfearn, 2009; 
McMillen, 2010). However, in this paper we have to control for a large number 
of dwelling and neighborhood characteristics (see Table 1), which makes the use 
of a fully nonparametric model infeasible. Moreover, due to endogeneity issues 
with our key explanatory variable (homeownership rate), we will use a fairly 
simple hedonic regression model of the partial linear form. As a starting point, 
we consider a model 
 
(1) ( )* , ,ij ij j i i ijp amenity f lo la uβ δ′= + + +x  
 
where pij denotes the log of transaction price of dwelling i in neighborhood (or 
grid) j, xij is a vector of dwelling and neighborhood characteristics, f(loi, lai) is an 
unknown function of longitude and latitude coordinates of the dwelling (loi, lai) 
and uij is the error term. The function f(.) captures unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics that do not vary within the local estimation window as explained 
further below.9  
We assume that homeowners can make investments into neighborhood amenities 
and social capital, which we denote for simplicity with a scalar amenity.10 More 
precisely, these are not all neighborhood amenities, but just the ones related to 
the prevalence of homeowners in the neighborhood. The upshot of this strategy is 
that we can remain agnostic of what exactly these amenities are. According to 
hedonic theory, the parameter δ can be interpreted as households’ mean marginal 
willingness to pay (MWTP) for a small change in neighborhood amenities (see 
Rosen, 1974). Naturally, we expect a positive impact for an amenity, i.e. 0.δ >  
The variables in x and the coordinates (lo, la) are observed by homebuyers and 
                                              
9 The model is a variant of partial linear models introduced by Robinson (1988). See Rossi-Hansberg et 
al. (2010) for a recent housing market application of the model. 
10 It is not clear whether neighborhood specific social capital is capitalized into housing prices. 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) assume that it is not because newcomers do not instantaneously gain 
social capital meaning that it cannot capitalize, but Hilber (2010) finds empirical evidence of the contrary. 
Social capital could enhance the ability of neighbors to invest in amenities that require efforts from more 
than one household. However, it could be that some neighborhood investments of homeowners do not 
capitalize into housing prices even when they create externalities. 
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the econometrician, but amenity and u are observed only by the homebuyers, 
which means that δ  is not identified without further assumptions. However, 
according to theory in DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Hoff and Sen (2005) and 
Hilber (2010), the amenity level in each neighborhood is a function  
of the neighborhood’s homeownership rate, i.e. ( ).amenity g ownrate=  If 
homeowners produce positive neighborhood externalities we expect that 
/ 0.amenity ownrate∂ ∂ >  
If we make the simplifying assumption that *amenity ownrateα=  and plug this 
into (1) we get11 
 
  (2) ( )* , .ij ij j i i ijp ownrate f lo la uβ δα′= + + +x  
 
Estimating equation (2) (and assuming no endogeneity problems) identifies the 
product ,δα  not the mean MWTP for neighborhood amenities. However, δα  is 
the relevant parameter for housing and tax policy purposes because it takes into 
account both the valuation that homebuyers have for neighborhood amenities 
and, in a sense, how productive homeowners are in “producing” these amenities. 
A sufficient test for positive externalities is to test whether 0.δα >  It is 
important to stress that in this setup homebuyers value the neighborhood’s 
amenity level, not homeownership rate per se. Moreover, we do not have to 
assume that homebuyers observe the neighborhood’s homeownership rate. They 
simply need to observe the amenity level. 
This argumentation is easily extended to neighborhood disamenities for which 
the MWTP would be negative ( 0δ < ). In this case, if homeowners create 
positive externalities to neighborhoods (or reduce negative externalities) they 
should lower the disamenity level ( 0α < ). Again a sufficient test for positive 
externalities is to test whether 0.δα >  Furthermore, a negative sign for δα  
would always indicate that homeowners inflict negative neighborhood 
externalities. This could arise if increasing homeownership rate in a 
neighborhood leads to lower amenity levels ( 0 and 0δ α> < ) or to higher 
disamenity levels ( 0 and 0δ α< > ). Of course, for a full evaluation of the pro-
homeownership tax policies, we should also know how effective current policies 
are in encouraging homeownership. This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
                                              
11 The parameter α can be interpreted as “the intensity of neighborhood amenity production by 
homeowners” (see also Kling et al., 2007). This linearity assumption is made for simplicity and the 
following arguments do not hinge on the assumption.  
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4.2 Instrument choice 
In equation (2) neighborhood homeownership rate is possibly correlated with the 
error term even with a rich set of controls and the partial linear specification with 
dwelling coordinates. This could be either due to sorting according to some 
unobservable neighborhood characteristic that affects prices and attracts 
homeowners or due to simultaneity of prices and homeownership.12 Regardless 
of the reasons for endogeneity an instrumental variable strategy is needed.  
Our instrument choice is based on the fact that there are economies of scale in 
producing housing services that are related to building size in terms of number of 
units per building (see e.g. Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002; Glaeser, 2011). This may 
arise through fixed costs in setting up building maintenance and management. It 
could also be cheaper to arrange the cleaning and maintenance of common 
facilities or tenant selection and monitoring in one building compared to many 
buildings dispersed across space. Thus, if there are economies of scale, we 
should expect institutional landlords to own big buildings rather than many small 
ones for a given amount of investment in real estate.13 Furthermore, residents in a 
multi-unit building face a common pool problem because major maintenance 
problems are building, not unit specific (see Linneman, 1985; Glaeser and 
Shapiro, 2003; and Glaeser, 2011). The owners of individual units in a multi-unit 
building have an incentive to free-ride on the expense of other owners in the 
building when it comes to investments into common facilities and building 
maintenance. This may apply to neighborhood amenities as well. Naturally, the 
common pool problems increase as the number of occupants increases. However, 
these common pool problems are not present when a single landlord owns the 
whole building.  
These arguments suggest that housing structure and the number of housing units 
per building in a neighborhood, in particular, should drive the homeownership 
rate of a neighborhood. More precisely, building size and homeownership rate 
should be negatively correlated.14 This means that the number of units per 
building in a neighborhood is a natural choice for an instrument. The identifying 
assumption is that the number of housing units per building is not correlated with 
the error term in the hedonic regression model.  
                                              
12 Since we control for a large number of neighborhood attributes and also include nonparametric function 
of coordinates in our hedonic specification, we expect simultaneity (or reverse causality) to be a more 
serious problem. We discuss the endogeneity problem and its implications further in Section 5.  
13 A single landlord (a small investor) may also like to own units in the same building due to lower 
monitoring costs because they know the building, the board that make maintenance decisions etc. 
14 Some recent studies also find empirical evidence on this. For example, Hilber (2011) and Lerbs and 
Oberst (2011) report that housing structure and especially building size is an important driver of whether 
a housing unit is owner-occupied. 
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In order to make this assumption plausible, we control directly for a number of 
household socioeconomic characteristics along with neighborhood population 
level and total number of buildings. We also control for the floor level of the 
transacted unit and the total number of floors in the building of the transacted 
unit. Moreover, we control for the maintenance charge of the unit which should 
capture the effects that building size may have on maintenance expenses and 
their effect on transaction price. In addition, as a robustness check we use the 
method by Nevo and Rosen (2012) that relaxes some of the assumptions of our 
instrumental variable and still produces a meaningful set identification result or 
bounds for the parameter of interest. 
4.3 Estimation 
The partial linear model can be estimated as follows (Robinson, 1988).15 The first 
step is to use nonparametric regression to regress p and each variable in the 
parametric part (x) individually on the variables in the nonparametric part, in this 
case the coordinates (lo, la). For this step we employ local linear regression with 
nearest-neighbor bandwidths (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988; Li and Racine, 2007). 
Then form the residuals from each of these regressions, say ep and ex1,…, exk.16 
The second step is to use OLS to run a regression of ep on ex1,…, exk. The 
coefficients for the residuals are consistent estimates of the parameters in the 
parametric part of the model and the standard errors are valid as well. When 
instrumental variables (say z) are used, we simply run the nonparametric 
regression using the instrument as the dependent variable and coordinates on the 
right hand side and save the residuals (say ez). In the second stage, instead of 
OLS, we run 2SLS using the residuals (ez) as an instrument for the residual of the 
endogenous variable (Li and Stengos, 1996; Li and Racine, 2007).  
The model produces a location specific intercept (an estimate of the function f(.)), 
which captures unobservable neighborhood quality that stays constant within the 
locally fitted regression or local window. This mitigates both endogeneity and 
spatial autocorrelation problems that may arise due to omitted variables that vary 
at a broader spatial scale than the local window used in the estimation. Thus, the 
intercept term in the partial linear model works in a similar way as a spatial fixed 
effect but with one important difference: in the fixed effects specification it is 
assumed that there is a discontinuous jump at the fixed effect area borders (say 
zip codes) whereas the intercept in the partial linear model varies smoothly over 
space. Another way to illustrate the difference is to consider a housing unit 
situated just at a zip code border. In this case, the fixed effects estimator uses 
                                              
15 See Li and Racine (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the partial linear model and its estimation 
using different estimation techniques. 
16 This can be seen as spatial differencing akin to a spatial fixed effect where you subtract the weighted 
mean value of a given observation’s nearest neighbors from each variable of the observation. Since only 
coordinates enter the nonparametric part, proximity is simply geographic distance. The mean is basically 
calculated using inverse distance as weight so that nearer observations get more weight.  
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only observations within the same zip code in calculating the fixed effects 
transformation. Obviously, using nearby units from both sides of the zip code 
border can capture unobservable neighborhood quality in some cases in a more 
plausible way. We report results also from a zip code fixed effects model for 
comparison.  
Using a smooth intercept to control for unobservable neighborhood 
characteristics may be problematic when some unobservable characteristics, in 
fact, vary discretely over space. An example would be binding school catchment 
zone boundaries where school quality might change discretely just at the 
boundary. We do not expect this to be a major issue in Helsinki for several 
reasons. First, the school choice system allows the students to attend schools 
outside of their school catchment area. Second, according to PISA tests variance 
in quality of Finnish schools is relatively low (or at least much lower than in 
most other OECD countries). Third, unlike in many countries Finnish pupils are 
not tested regularly using standardized tests and when these tests are carried out 
the results are not made public. The reason is that Finnish education policy 
makers are concerned that publication of test scores and school quality would 
lead to larger differences among schools and segregation based on school quality.  
A key issue in the estimation process is choosing the bandwidth or the number of 
nearest neighbors used in the nonparametric regressions in the first step. A 
smaller local window (i.e. the number of neighbors) means that the 
nonparametric part can capture neighborhood quality and unobserved factors at a 
more local level. However, in our case the size of the local window or the 
number of nearest neighbors is constrained from below because the 
neighborhood variables are measured based on fixed sized grids. If the local 
window is too small, in some cases all the observations within a local window 
will be in the same grid and there would be no variation in the neighborhood 
variables making identification impossible. The average number of transactions 
in a grid in our data is about 9. However, the maximum number is 143, which is 
the lower limit for the size of our local window. The average number of 
observations in a zip code is about 106 whereas the maximum is 446. We select 
the number of nearest neighbors so that there will be enough independent 
variation for each neighborhood characteristic. We also experiment with 
bandwidths of different size using 150, 200 and 300 nearest neighbors or 
transactions. In all specifications, we use the second order Gaussian Kernel in the 
nonparametric step. 
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5. Results  
5.1 Main results 
Results from our hedonic models are presented in Table 2. Note that we report 
only the results concerning neighborhood homeownership rate in Table 2, while 
the full results from the hedonic models are reported in the Appendix. 
Homeownership rate and other neighborhood characteristics are standardized so 
that the coefficient measures the percentage change in prices as a neighborhood’s 
homeownership rate increases by one standard deviation. As a benchmark we 
estimated simple OLS models with and without zip code fixed effects. The OLS 
model without zip code fixed effects and controlling for other neighborhood 
characteristics produces a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
neighborhood homeownership rate. At face value, this rather surprising result 
means that increasing neighborhood homeownership rate by one standard 
deviation (roughly 14 percentage points) decreases house values by 
approximately 6 percent. Including zip code fixed effects reduces this effect 
substantially to 2 percent.  
Table 2.  Point estimates from hedonic models. 
 
 
OLS OLS 2SLS
Homeownership rate -0.057** -0.024** -0.071
(0.008) (0.003) (0.048)
Zip code fixed effects no yes yes
F-test for instrument .. .. 19.80
R 2 0.91 0.94 0.94
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472
nn = 150 nn = 200 nn = 300
Homeownership rate, -0.015** -0.019** -0.022**
not instrumented (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Homeownership rate, -0.024 0.004 0.031
instrumented (0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
F-test for instrument 26.73 25.20 20.25
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472
Panel A: Linear model
Panel B: Partial linear model
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of transaction price. All models include 
the control variables reported in Table 1 and quarter of sale dummies. Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The marking nn refers to the 
number of nearest neighbors or bandwidth size used in the local regressions in the partial 
linear model. ** and * indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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The partial linear models with small bandwidths (150, 200 and 300 nearest 
neighbors) produce similar results. In absolute terms, the coefficient is slightly 
smaller or of similar size as in the OLS zip code fixed effects model. As the 
bandwidth size is increased the coefficient on homeownership rate increases in 
absolute terms, although not very much. This might indicate that smaller 
bandwidths work better in mitigating endogeneity problems or control better for 
unobserved neighborhood variables.  
There are two possible explanations for the negative coefficient. First, the result 
could be the true causal effect so that in multi-storey buildings homeowners’ net 
effect on neighborhood amenity level and house prices is indeed negative (e.g. 
δ α> <0 and 0 ). One possible mechanism is outlined in Linneman (1986), 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Glaeser (2011). Multiple owners in a building 
create a common pool problem in investment decisions concerning building 
specific projects and in neighborhoods with high homeownership rates buildings 
could be in worse shape. Second, the result could be explained by reverse 
causality. Households may be reluctant to own expensive homes because it 
distorts the allocation of their wealth portfolio as explained in Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983), Brueckner (1997) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002). For this 
reason, households with a clear preference for homeownership may sort into 
lower price neighborhoods, whereas households with a clear preference for an 
expensive neighborhood (sea shore etc.) may choose to rent and not distort their 
wealth portfolio too much towards housing capital.17 If this is the case the result 
is due to endogeneity and the effect is not the true causal effect of neighborhood 
homeownership rate on house prices.   
We find the latter explanation more plausible and therefore an IV strategy is 
needed. Using 2SLS with zip code fixed effects again produces a negative effect, 
but the effect is not statistically significant. The first stage F-test statistic is 24.6 
indicating that the instrument has good explanatory power. The partial linear 
model with the smallest bandwidth (150) also produces a negative, but 
statistically insignificant effect. With larger bandwidth (200 and 300) the 
coefficient is positive, but again the coefficient is not statistically significant in 
either model. The instrument works well also with the partial linear model as can 
be seen from the high F-test values. Furthermore, in all cases, the partial 
correlation of the instrument and homeownership rate in the first stage is 
negative as expected.  
Our preferred results from the partial linear models with instrumental variables 
indicate that neighborhood homeownership rate has no effect on housing prices, 
                                              
17 Another potential and related reason for sorting is that user-cost-to-rent ratios can vary across 
neighborhoods and homeownership might be lower in neighborhoods with higher user-cost-to-rent ratios 
due to differences in expected capital gains (see e.g. DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Amior and Halket, 
2011). 
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and thus, there is no evidence of positive externalities. This result is contrary to 
the theoretical predictions by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Hoff and Sen 
(2005). However, the results could be explained by at least two things. First, 
homeowners’ incentives to invest in neighborhood amenities could depend on 
building type. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) argue that single-family 
homeowners are physically more connected to their immediate neighborhood 
compared to homeowners living in multi-storey buildings. This means that the 
latter group benefits less from neighborhood quality, and thus, has weaker 
incentives to invest in their neighborhood. Common pool problems may weaken 
the incentives further.  
Second, households’ willingness to pay for neighborhood amenities may also 
depend on building type. If this is the case, our results are in line with Autor et al. 
(2011) who studied housing market externalities in the context of rent control 
abolishment in Cambridge Massachusetts. As rent control ended, landlords in 
Massachusetts had more incentives to invest in the quality of their dwellings and 
this could have a spillover price effect on surrounding dwellings. They find 
strong spillover effects, but the effects were much stronger on individual houses 
compared to condominiums. This could be explained by the fact that households 
living in condominiums are less connected to their neighborhood than 
households living in single-family houses. This means that neighborhood quality 
is less important to condominium households and they are not willing to pay as 
high a price premium on neighborhood quality as households living in single-
family houses. 
The theoretical models by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and Hoff and Sen 
(2005) do not differentiate homeowners’ incentives according to building type. 
Therefore we cannot claim that our results refute these models. Our results do 
suggest, however, that homeowners’ investment incentives are not strong in 
multi-unit buildings and the predictions from DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) and 
Hoff and Sen (2005) may be confined to homeowners living single-family 
houses. 
5.2 Robustness check using set identification 
The assumption that our instrument is exogenous may not be true. For example, 
the prevalence of large buildings may be associated with unpleasant 
neighborhoods because they block sunlight and view. This could induce 
correlation between the instrument and the error term. In this section, we present 
results using a set identification method developed by Nevo and Rosen (2012) 
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that relaxes this assumption and allows for an imperfect instrument.18 To 
illustrate the method consider the following model specification 
 
(3) * ,p ownrate uγ= +  
 
where p  and ownrate  denote the log of transaction price and homeownership 
rate from which we have netted out the effects of the unit’s coordinates (lo, la) 
and control variables (x). Let z denote our instrument. Instead of assuming that 
,( , ) 0,z ucorr z u ρ= =  we need to make assumptions about the signs of 
correlations between the error term, the endogenous regressor and our 
instrument. More specifically, we need to assume that the correlations between 
the endogenous regressor and the error term and between the instrument and the 
error term have the same sign implying that , , 0.z u ownrate uρ ρ⋅ ≥   
We believe that the sign assumptions for the correlations are plausible because of 
the following arguments. First, we assume that the correlation between the 
endogenous regressor and the error term is negative (  , 0ownrate uρ < ) due to 
simultaneity. This is a plausible assumption in our case as explained above. 
Households may be reluctant to own units in expensive neighborhoods because 
of portfolio diversification reasons, and thus, homeowners may sort into 
neighborhoods with lower house prices. Since we cannot necessarily control for 
this aspect well enough in our regressions, we expect the non-zero correlation 
between the error term and the regressor to be negative rather than positive. 
Second, we argue that the correlation between the instrument and the error term 
is also negative ( , 0z uρ < ). For example, if sunlight or prevalence of green areas 
affect prices (i.e. are in the error term of our hedonic regression model) a 
negative correlation arises because neighborhoods with big buildings will have 
lower levels of these amenities. Street crime incidence may also be higher in 
neighborhoods with tall buildings as reported by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000). 
This would also induce a negative correlation between the instrument and the 
error term. In addition, we know from the first stage of our instrumental variable 
models presented in Table 2 that the partial correlation between our instrument 
and homeownership rate is negative. These three assumptions together provide us 
with both a lower and an upper bound for the true parameter value, even when 
the instrument is not exogenous.  
                                              
18 See Nevo and Rosen (2012) for the formal presentation of linear model and Reinhold and Woutersen 
(2011) for the extension to the partial linear model. 
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The upper bound can be obtained using the standard IV regression or IV with the 
partial linear model as above. The intuition can be easily seen from the 
probability limit of the standard IV estimator: 
 
(4) ( )
 
,
,
plim ,z u uIV
z ownrate ownrate
ρ σγ γ γ
ρ σ
= + ⋅ ≥  
 
where ρ  again denotes the correlation and σ  denotes the standard deviation. 
With our assumptions, the second term of the probability limit is positive (since 
, ,, 0z u z ownrateρ ρ < ) and the IV estimator gives the upper bound for the true 
parameter γ. Similarly, the lower bound can be obtained using OLS because  
 
(5) ( ) 

,plim ,
u
OLS ownrate u
ownrate
σγ γ ρ γ
σ
= + ⋅ ≤  
 
where σ  again denotes the standard deviation. Thus, in our case, the above 
assumptions about the signs of the correlations are enough to identify bounds for 
the true parameter value.  
However, Nevo and Rosen (2012) show that tighter bounds can be obtained if we 
are willing to make a further assumption that the correlation between the 
endogenous regressor and the error term is larger than the correlation between the 
instrument and the error term, i.e.  ,, .z uownrate uρ ρ≥  This condition implies that 
while we allow , 0z uρ ≠ , the instrument needs to be “less endogenous” than the 
endogenous regressor. We think that this is a reasonable assumption in our 
application. Since we are controlling for a large number of factors affecting 
house prices, we expect the correlation between the error and the instrument to be 
quite negligible and at least smaller than the correlation between the endogenous 
regressor and the error term. When this condition is satisfied, one can estimate 
the lower bound using a generated instrumental variable suggested in Nevo and 
Rosen (2012). In our case, the generated instrumental variable is defined as 
Nevo Rosen ownrate zz z ownrateσ σ− = ⋅ − ⋅ .
19  
Naturally, these correlation assumptions cannot be directly tested because one 
never observes the error term. However, the assumptions used here are less strict 
                                              
19 Again see Nevo and Rosen (2012) for details.  
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than the usual assumptions needed for a valid instrument, which assume a zero 
correlation between the instrument and the error term.  
We also need to estimate the confidence interval for the identified set. Following 
Reinhold and Woutersen (2011), we use the regular bootstrap to estimate 
confidence intervals for the true parameter value. We sample units with 
replacement and get an estimate for the lower and upper bound for each 
subsample. We generate 400 subsamples for each bandwidth size. We then stack 
all the estimates of the upper and lower bound in an ordered vector (with length 
800) and calculate the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles, which give us the 95% 
confidence interval.  
The results using the Nevo and Rosen (2012) set identification strategy are 
presented in Table 3. We estimate both a linear model with zip code fixed effects 
and partial linear models with different number of nearest neighbors using the 
same model specifications as in Table 2. The figures in Table 3 correspond to the 
2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the bootstrapped parameter estimates. The bounds 
are rather large in all specifications and grow significantly in the partial linear 
model as the bandwidth is increased. However, in each case, zero is in the 
identified set of the true parameter value, and thus, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a zero effect. Interestingly, all the estimates from the partial linear 
models reported in Table 2 are within the confidence interval. However, the 
estimates from the partial linear models without instrumenting are quite close to 
the lower boundary of the confidence interval. 
 
Table 3.  Bootstrapped confidence intervals for Nevo-Rosen set estimates. 
 
 
 
 
Linear model nn = 150 nn = 200 nn = 300
Upper bound 0.003 0.048 0.085 0.125
Lower bound -0.168 -0.072 -0.046 -0.031
Observations 7,472 7,472 7,472 7,472
Notes: The table reports 95 percent confidence intervals for the true parameter value. The 
confidence intervals are based on 400 bootstrap repetitions per model.
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6. Conclusions 
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in many western countries. The adverse 
effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on economic 
efficiency and income distribution are well documented in the economics 
literature. Given these facts, the main argument in favor of encouraging 
homeownership has to be that it creates positive externalities. If homeowners 
create positive externalities to their neighbors by improving neighborhood 
quality, neighborhoods with high homeownership rates are more desirable for 
prospective buyers, which should translate into higher housing prices. 
In this paper, we tested this hypothesis using semiparametric hedonic regression 
models with and without instrumental variables. Our strategy was to estimate a 
hedonic house price model using data from multi-storey buildings where 
neighborhood homeownership rate is included as an explanatory variable. We 
found no evidence of positive externalities from neighborhood homeownership 
rate that capitalize into housing prices. We also tested the robustness of these 
results by relaxing the identification assumptions of our instrument using the 
method proposed by Nevo and Rosen (2012). In this method, the instrument is 
allowed to be correlated with the error term of the hedonic regression, while 
providing a meaningful set identification result. Using this method, we could not 
reject the null hypothesis that the true effect of neighborhood homeownership 
rate on house prices is zero. Unfortunately, the bounds for the true effect were 
estimated with some imprecision.  
Our results are in line with the results reported by Barker and Miller (2009) and 
Engelhardt et al. (2010) who find that the beneficial effects of homeownership on 
several outcomes may have been exaggerated in earlier literature. The results also 
suggest that building type may influence residents’ incentives to invest in their 
neighborhood. Explicit consideration of building type should be a fruitful avenue 
in future research concerning various neighborhood effects.  
Our results are also policy relevant as they suggest that the adverse efficiency 
effects of lenient tax treatment of owner-occupied housing are not offset by 
positive neighborhood externalities. This means that the tax favored status that 
homeownership enjoys in many countries should be scrutinized, at least when a 
large portion of the tax subsidy is directed to owner-occupiers in multi-storey 
buildings as in Finland. Possible reforms include taxing the imputed rental 
income from owner-occupied housing the same way as other capital income, 
reducing the mortgage interest deduction or making landlords’ rental income tax 
free. The last two suggestions would not result in a neutral tax system, but could 
be steps toward a more level playing field for homeowners and renters in terms 
of housing costs.  
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Of course the results from this paper concern homeownership in multi-storey 
buildings and may not generalize to other building types. On the other hand, 
because of agency problems related to renting in single-family houses, they are 
likely to be owner-occupied even in the absence of tax subsidies. If this is the 
case, tax subsidies to homeowners in single-family houses are also redundant in 
the sense that they do not increase homeownership. 
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Appendix. Additional regression results. 
Table A1.  Results from linear models. 
 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Dwelling:
   log(floor area) 0.854** 0.013 0.848** 0.005 0.845** 0.005
   log(age) -0.028* 0.013 -0.056** 0.005 -0.050** 0.008
   Good 0.159** 0.009 0.150** 0.006 0.150** 0.006
   Satisfactory 0.067** 0.009 0.066** 0.007 0.066** 0.007
   Own lot 0.081** 0.012 0.034** 0.005 0.033** 0.006
   Elevator 0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004
   Floor level 0.016** 0.002 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001
   Number of floors -0.007* 0.003 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012** 0.002
   Maintenance charge -0.010* 0.005 -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003
   Distance CBD -0.026** 0.004 -0.019** 0.005 -0.013* 0.007
   Nearest train or subway stop 0.013* 0.009 0.018** 0.006 0.020** 0.006
   Distance to sea -0.013* 0.008 -0.029** 0.008 -0.019* 0.013
Neighborhood:
   Homeownership rate -0.057** 0.008 -0.024** 0.003 -0.071 0.048
   log(median income) 0.052** 0.015 0.027** 0.007 0.062* 0.035
   Share of college educated 0.080** 0.017 0.042** 0.006 0.063** 0.022
   Unemployment rate -0.010** 0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.007
   Share of pension h'holds 0.007 0.006 0.010** 0.003 0.025 0.015
   Share of h'holds with children -0.052** 0.011 -0.025** 0.005 -0.038** 0.014
   Service jobs per capita 0.015* 0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003
   Number of buildings 0.022** 0.008 0.014** 0.003 0.012** 0.004
   Population 0.011 0.010 -0.025** 0.004 -0.023** 0.004
   Mean floor area of units 0.030** 0.013 0.008 0.006 -0.006 0.016
OLS, no FE OLS, FE 2SLS, FE
Notes: The table reports results from linear models where the dependent variable is the natural log of 
transaction price. All models include quarter of sale dummies. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. ** and * indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table A2.  Results from partial linear models where homeownership is not 
instrumented. 
 
 
nn = 300
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Dwelling:
   log(floor area) 0.843** 0.004 0.844** 0.004 0.846** 0.004
   log(age) -0.056** 0.006 -0.060** 0.006 -0.065** 0.005
   Good 0.153** 0.006 0.153** 0.006 0.152** 0.006
   Satisfactory 0.067** 0.006 0.067** 0.006 0.067** 0.006
   Own lot 0.037** 0.005 0.041** 0.005 0.044** 0.005
   Elevator 0.0005 0.003 -0.0005 0.003 -0.002 0.004
   Floor level 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001
   Number of floors -0.011** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.013** 0.001
   Maintenance charge -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003
   Distance CBD 0.002 0.005 0.0003 0.004 -0.006* 0.003
   Nearest train or subway stop -0.003 0.010 -0.009 0.007 -0.012* 0.005
   Distance to sea -0.047** 0.017 -0.039** 0.012 -0.038** 0.008
Neighborhood:
   Homeownership rate -0.015** 0.003 -0.019** 0.003 -0.022** 0.003
   log(median income) 0.018** 0.006 0.019** 0.006 0.020** 0.006
   Share of college educated 0.024** 0.006 0.038** 0.006 0.048** 0.005
   Unemployment rate -0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.003
   Share of pension h'holds 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006* 0.003
   Share of h'holds with children -0.012** 0.005 -0.014** 0.004 -0.017** 0.004
   Service jobs per capita -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
   Number of buildings 0.011** 0.003 0.013** 0.003 0.015** 0.003
   Population -0.021** 0.004 -0.025** 0.004 -0.025** 0.003
   Mean floor area of units 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.006
Notes: The table reports results from partial linear models where the dependent variable is the 
natural log of transaction price. All models include quarter of sale dummies. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. The marking nn refers to the number of nearest neighbors or 
bandwidth size used in the local regressions. ** and * indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
nn = 150 nn = 200
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Table A3.  Results from partial linear models where homeownership is 
instrumented. 
 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Dwelling:
   log(floor area) 0.843** 0.004 0.845** 0.004 0.849** 0.005
   log(age) -0.055** 0.008 -0.064** 0.008 -0.074** 0.009
   Good 0.153** 0.006 0.153** 0.006 0.153** 0.007
   Satisfactory 0.067** 0.006 0.067** 0.006 0.066** 0.007
   Own lot 0.037** 0.006 0.042** 0.006 0.048** 0.006
   Elevator 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.004
   Floor level 0.016** 0.001 0.016** 0.001 0.015** 0.001
   Number of floors -0.011** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.013** 0.001
   Maintenance charge -0.011** 0.003 -0.011** 0.003 -0.010** 0.003
   Distance CBD 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.011* 0.005
   Nearest train or subway stop -0.002 0.010 -0.013 0.009 -0.021** 0.008
   Distance to sea -0.046* 0.018 -0.041** 0.013 -0.042** 0.009
Neighborhood:
   Homeownership rate -0.024 0.038 0.004 0.038 0.031 0.041
   log(median income) 0.025 0.028 0.002 0.028 -0.019 0.031
   Share of college educated 0.029 0.017 0.028 0.016 0.027 0.017
   Unemployment rate -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.007
   Share of pension h'holds 0.004 0.012 -0.004 0.012 -0.012 0.014
   Share of h'holds with children -0.016 0.014 -0.0063 0.014 0.000 0.014
   Service jobs per capita -0.001 0.002 -0.0001 0.002 0.003 0.002
   Number of buildings 0.011** 0.003 0.013** 0.003 0.014** 0.003
   Population -0.021** 0.004 -0.025** 0.004 -0.026** 0.004
   Mean floor area of units 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.011
nn = 150 nn = 200 nn = 300
Notes: The table reports results from partial linear models where the dependent variable is the 
natural log of transaction price and homeownership is instrumented. All models include quarter of 
sale dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The marking nn refers to the 
number of nearest neighbors or bandwidth size used in the local regressions. ** and * indicate 1 
and 5 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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